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Abstract Clinical practice always necessitates proper diag-
nosis and correct treatment. For most clinical fields, determin-
ing the cause of the illness is irrelevant to the intervention. An
oncologist, for example, has no need to explore the “cause” of
the patient’s lymphoma. Allergists, by contrast, have tools and
the need to examine the relevant allergen which is the putative
“cause” of the patient’s allergic symptomatology. In the con-
text of a legal claim, the “cause” of the symptoms or disorder
is central, because it determines financial responsibility. How-
ever, in the case of an allergic disorder and identified allergen,
a claim requires more. Whose allergen? Where did it come
from? These are crucial questions that must be answered. This
paper explores the approaches to causal assessment which are
important for the clinical allergist as he/she navigates the
interface between clinical practice and legal proceedings. Its
purpose is to help the allergist understand that interface, and to
be prepared to enter an unfamiliar legal arena.
Keywords Causation . Causation analysis . Medical/legal .
Source identification . Differential diagnosis . Differential
diagnosis vs. Causation
Introduction
Diagnosis, treatment, and prevention are the primary roles of
the practicing physician.What is wrong with the patient? How
do I treat him? How do I keep him well? Causal analyses are
secondary, and, for most clinical fields, entirely unimportant.
It does not much matter to an oncologist, for example, what
caused the patient’s leukemia. The patient will frequently ask
or supply his own theories, but the therapeutic intervention is
determined by the diagnosis, not the etiology.
By contrast, legal disputes, as opposed to clinical ones,
almost always involve causal questions and demand causal
answers. Did the contaminated drinking water cause the
cancer? Did formaldehyde from the insulation cause the
chronic rhinitis? Did the mold in the home arising from a
leaking roof or window cause the child’s asthma? Did the
asbestos in the workplace cause the lung cancer or was it the
40 pack-years of cigarette smoking? The answers to such
questions are central to asserting liability claims against the
polluter, the insulation installer, the home builder, or the
asbestos producer in a court of law.
Allergists, as distinguished from oncologists, rheumatolo-
gists, and orthopedic surgeons frequently address the ques-
tion, “What caused the patient’s allergy?” This clinically
important causal question, when addressed, may require fas-
tidious history taking and diagnostic approaches such as al-
lergy skin testing and other diagnostic inhalational/dermal/
oral/subcutaneous challenges. Since not all patients who are
skin tested demonstrate clinical concordance with the history
elicited, that question may have a presumptive, but unproven
answer. For example, was it allergic versus vasomotor rhini-
tis? Or was it allergic versus irritant-induced asthma. In the
context of a lawsuit, an allergist’s working diagnosis is insuf-
ficient. A supportable, final diagnosis is necessary.
Another, less familiar, causal question is also demanded
in legal proceedings. In addition to a determination of which
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agent or agents are responsible for symptoms, a liability
claim usually requires expert opinions about the source of
that agent. Where did it come from? Who was responsible?
Historically, patients rarely ask: “whose pollen, which latex
product, or where did the mold come from?” That changed
for allergists when various environmentally-encountered
agents acquired the dual role of both potential allergens
and the subject of a lawsuit. This placed a new demand on
allergists who were now asked to assist a patient by offering
expert medical opinions about the strength of association or
link between the suspected source of the allergen and the
medical symptoms or illness observed.
Moreover, the allergist must be prepared to explain the
basis for that attribution in part relying on other experts who
may have identified how, when, and why the suspected
environmental conditions or agents occurred. But the aller-
gist must be able to comfortably link those findings to the
clinical disorder. He may be asked to support that causal
nexus with these types of questions: “Doctor, given the
airborne level of mold spores found and the description of
the water damage, was the duration and extent of potential
exposure sufficient to have caused the patient’s asthma?”
“What is your basis for that conclusion?”
The purpose of this discussion is to elucidate, for aller-
gists, this interface between clinical responsibilities of the
doctor and legal demands of the patient as claimant and the
court system. Even for clinical allergists who have no inten-
tion of or desire to be formally hired as experts, causal
questions involving both the documentation of the specific
allergy and the assessment of the source of the allergen(s)
are important to the patient who is also a claimant. For an
allergist hired by the plaintiff or the defendant’s attorney as
an expert witness for the purpose of establishing causation,
both questions, their answers, and a critical analysis of the
bases for those answers are the linchpins of the expert’s role.
In the discussion to follow, we shall attempt to delineate
those questions which must be asked and answered by the
allergist as expert witness. We will begin with the medical
causation issues, followed by the source identification
issues. We will then present the legal requirements and show
how and why physicians can be led astray or have their
testimony excluded by judges for lack of a proper method-
ology or foundation. The goal of this article is to provide the
allergist with the necessary information to assure reliability
and admissibility of his testimony so it is helpful to the court
and to minimize the risk of a disconcerting experience.
Medical Causation Analysis
The science of causation assessment is well accepted and
generally recognized. This is the field which refers to the
scientific methods by which, for example, a microbiological
agent, chemical, allergen, irritant, drug, or medical device can
be causally connected to or ruled out as a cause of disease.
To determine whether a causal relationship exists be-
tween a given agent or substance and adverse health effects,
it is essential that proper causation methodology be applied.
Methods of assessing causal relationships are not matters of
opinion. Rather, methods for investigating causal relation-
ships between agents and illnesses have been well delineat-
ed in the scientific literature [1–14].
One simplified overview of the components of a proper
causal analysis was published by one of the authors who
called the methodology the “Does, Can, Did” approach [6].
“Does” refers to the diagnosis: from what ailment(s) does
the patient suffer? “Can” refers to the capability of the
alleged causal agent to actually cause the identified disor-
der(s). And “Did” refers to the result of specific investiga-
tion carried out to link the putative causal agent(s) to the
specific individual patient. The first component, “does,” is
the diagnostic element. This, of course, is familiar to the
clinician because it is the bedrock of clinical as well as
medical legal practice. However, the very fact of a claim
against an employer or a presumed tortfeasor (a person who
has committed a wrongful act) adds a confounder to the
diagnostic encounter which can lead the practitioner astray
if not considered. The next two elements: “Can” and “Did”
have, since the introduction of these descriptive terms, been
named by the courts as “general” and “specific” causation.
Numerous decisions concerning expert testimony and the
very admissibility of an expert’s opinion have turned on
these causal elements.
General Causation
In order to arrive at cause and effect conclusions regard-
ing exposures and health effects or disease processes,
certain elements are crucial. First, there must be scientif-
ic knowledge that the agent is capable of causing the
health effects or conditions in question. This element has
been called “general causation.” Second, there must be
sufficient information available to conclude that the
agent was causal in this specific individual. This is called
“specific causation.”
In many specialty areas, general causation is established
through epidemiologic studies. The method by which those
studies are combined and weighed to assess causal proba-
bilities has been most closely connected to a speech by Sir
Bradford Hill in 1965 [10]. Dr. Hill was speaking about the
growing numbers of studies which linked lung cancers to
cigarette smoking and asked: how many studies of what
quality are necessary before we can assert a causal relation-
ship? The principles which he laid out in that speech are
commonly called (though not exactly correctly) “Hill’s
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Criteria” and they lay the foundation for much of general
causation oversight in the courts today.
There is much more medical knowledge about the cause
of common allergic diseases than about causes of cancer.
Consequently, when epidemiologic studies have not estab-
lished chemical X to be a carcinogen, it is methodologically
improper for an oncology expert to assert that it caused his
patient’s cancer. For pure allergy matters, by contrast, clini-
cians properly rely on medical evidence which is not always
supported by epidemiological studies. The chemical nature
of a substance, its potential as an allergen, and clinical
experience in many patients is often sufficient. However,
allergists also deal with non-allergic responses which pres-
ent general causation conundrums requiring epidemiology
and basic toxicology in order for a general causal assertion
to be justified.
Consider, for example, a claim of irritation associated or
suspected with a workplace chemical, new furniture or
carpet, fresh paint, or a perfume. Consider the progression
of this irritation into Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syn-
drome, a medically unproven condition. Before the allergist
asserts that the patient’s symptoms and/or clinical manifes-
tations were caused by the irritant effects of the chemical
alleged, he/she had better know that that chemical is, in fact,
an irritant and at what levels such effects occur. This can
generally be found in the basic toxicological literature
[15–17]. So, while formaldehyde can be mildly irritating at
between 0.1 and 0.3 parts per million, benzene, toluene, and
most other common organic chemical constituents of paints,
gasoline, and perfume are not [18, 19]. Alcohols, simple
aliphatic hydrocarbons, and a simple benzene ring generally
have mild-to-no irritating properties, whereas aldehydes and
ketones are significantly more irritating. The allergist must
assume that, if he asserts the existence of a causal link
between symptoms and the alleged chemical irritant in the
context of his patient’s claim, he will be questioned about
basic toxicological principles pertaining to irritation and
chemical structure. It is, after all, fair game for the opposing
attorney to ask about and to challenge the methodology
which led the physician to reach his general causal conclu-
sion. And, in this case, that methodology is premised upon
the basic toxicological/irritant properties of the relevant
chemicals.
Certain general causation questions of dubious estab-
lished connection may confront the allergist. An example
may be the multi-organ, multi-system complaints which the
patient has attributed to mold or mold toxins. Everything
from cognitive dysfunction to gastrointestinal disturbances
fall into the category of common symptoms with little
general causal scientific support [20–26]. The allergist
who affirms the patient’s causal belief in such matters can
expect probing questioning about the scientific merits of that
claim by a well-prepared attorney.
Specific Causation
Once the general causation question is asked and answered
affirmatively, the physician can move on to the specific
causation issue. Now that we have established the plausibil-
ity of the contended causal relationship, we must answer the
question: “Has it actually occurred in this patient?”
Specific causation is made up of several essential sub-
parts: (1) the dose must have been sufficient to have caused
the claimed adverse health outcome; (2) the temporal rela-
tionship must have been correct; (3) if the claimed disorder
is allergenically-based, the individual must have demon-
strated allergic sensitization to the agent(s) at issue; and
(4) other causes must have been considered and ruled out.
Figure 1 illustrates the distinction between the diagnostic
methodology and the causation assessment methodology.
An evaluation begins with a quest for the diagnosis utilizing
a standard differential diagnostic approach. Causation as-
sessment, a distinct and separate process, follows utilizing
the principles previously delineated.
The Role of Differential Diagnosis in Causal Analysis
From a scientific/medical perspective, the law requires that
the expert who is providing a medical opinion on causation
follow a methodology consistent with the methodology
utilized by his peer group. In the past few years, a growing
number of courts have, quite improperly, in our opinion,
taken that requirement to mean that the process of differen-
tial diagnosis would properly lead to both a diagnosis and a
causal conclusion. Figure 1 illustrates why that is not the
case. If it were true that the diagnostic process uncovered an
external cause with no further analysis required, a physician
could ascribe any cause of his/her choosing to an ailment,
whether or not there was even a modicum of scientific
support for such a connection. He could simply assert that
the patient suffers from a disorder of his own invention and
that his conclusion was the result of having excluded all
other conditions in the differential diagnosis. A causal con-
clusion requires an analysis quite separate from a diagnosis.
The fact that an oncologist establishes a diagnosis of acute
myelogenous leukemia and states that it was due to benzene
exposure does not mean that he/she has supported that
causal attribution. Simply asserting that the patient has
AML caused by benzene does not make that assertion
correct. To be correct, the general and specific methodolog-
ical approaches necessary for specific causation delineated
above must have been followed.
The same can be said for a diagnosis by an allergist. One
might diagnose probable occupational asthma rather than
exacerbation of non-occupational adult-onset asthma, but
such a conclusion needs more that a history alone to
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establish and testify to the probability of that causal attribu-
tion. Recognizing this dichotomy between diagnosis and
causal assessment, some courts have defined the processes
more like the one illustrated in Fig. 1 and called these
separate analyses “differential diagnosis” and “differential
etiology,” another name for causation assessment.
While it is indisputably true that the result of the differential
diagnostic process quite properly leads physicians to a clinical
diagnosis, it is certainly not the case, except in rare instances,
that it leads to causal conclusion. Even for allergists, there are
two processes. First, the allergist must determine whether the
red eyes are the result of irritation, infection, or allergy. Once
allergy becomes the diagnosis, only then can the etiology
(which allergen?) be sought and established.
Analyzing the Exposure Source
Identifying the source of the exposure is probably the most
vexing issue of all the causal questions which arise in a
lawsuit. Allergists are more attuned than most specialists to
this concept. They often need to provide allergy-mitigation
recommendations which can lead to generic protection by,
say, bed covers to reduce the load of dust mites.
However, in the context of a claim in which a roof leak is
linked by the patient or his/her lawyer to respiratory aller-
gies, the allergist must demonstrate an intense investigation
of the source of the allergen in order to establish a legally
acceptable causal conclusion. Often the allergist will accept
the patient’s attribution, converting and transforming the
patient’s perceived cause to a medically espoused and rati-
fied one. The patient said: “My symptoms started with the
roof leak and mold grew in the house; therefore, mold in the
house from the roof leak caused my illness.”
However, before the allergist can testify to such a causal
attribution, he/she must anticipate and consider how the
questioning by the opposing attorneywill proceed: “How long
did the roof leak and how much water damage was there?”
“How much mold grew and where was it?” “What genera and
species of moldwere found in the air?” “How large an area did
the mold cover?” “How representative of the entire living
space was the swab sample you reviewed?” “If you are claim-
ing that this was a ‘wet/damp’ space, how wet was it and how
much space was wet and damp?” and “Did you review the
indoor air evaluation reports or perform a site visit?” These are
only a few of the reasonable questions that will likely be asked
of a physician or any other expert who links a source, in this
case a roof leak, that allegedly led to mold growth that alleg-
edly led to a clinical outcome.
Patient/Claimant and Physician Confounders
It is not unusual for patients visiting the allergist to come
with some idea of the “cause” of their problems, whether it
is a specific food, seasonal outdoor allergens, a damp home,
workplace, perfume, or other environmental irritants. It is a
near certainty that, if a legal claim has prompted the visit to
the allergist’s office, the patient will think he or she “knows”
the cause of his/her complaints. It is also a given that a
refutation of a patient’s causal attribution, if not confirmed
by clinical evaluation, is more readily accepted by the
patient who is not a claimant than by one who is. The latter,
after all, is driven by two impulses—to get medical help and
to succeed in a pursuit of the claim.
The patient’s suspicions about the cause of his or her
illness, combined with the desire to hold someone liable for
causing that problem, inevitably leads to certain reporting
biases, whether intentional or subconscious, which com-
monly color the clinical history. Another bias in claims-
related matters is a form of attribution bias which comes
from fear or worry about environmental hazards. For
Fig. 1 Differential diagnosis
versus causation analysis
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example, the explosive proliferation of print and broadcast
media, as well as internet attention, to “toxic mold” has
contributed to the public’s attention to and fear of even
minute and harmless amounts of indoor contaminants.
Physicians, too, have, at times, contributed to patients’
beliefs that they are ill and that certain environmental factors
are the cause. By misattributing symptoms to a cause or
diagnosis of questionable validity, a physician can encour-
age and reinforce a patient’s notions and exacerbate the
illness through an iatrogenic effect [27]. All these issues,
reporting bias, hazard perception, and iatrogenic contribu-
tion, have been studied and documented [28–36]. Patient
and physician biases contribute both to the diagnostic inter-
action between the clinician and the patient/claimant, as well
as to the causal attribution and analysis by the clinician.
Legal Causation Analysis
The determination of legal causation of a medical illness
requires expert medical testimony on the medical and environ-
mental cause of injuries. This commonly includes a detailed
toxicological, epidemiological, and/or, at times, an industrial
hygiene-supported causal assessment.Whether or not the med-
ical opinion is admissible depends on whether it meets court-
accepted standards of reliability. In many states, and in federal
courts, that standard is known as the “Daubert standard.”
Admissibility of Expert Testimony
The specific legal rule in federal court pertaining to whether
an expert’s testimony is admissible is found in Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rule also applies to other
experts as well as to physicians.
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the
form of an opinion or otherwise if:
1. The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact (a judge or jury) to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
2. The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
3. The testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
4. The expert has reliably applied the principles and meth-
ods to the facts of the case.
Daubert Criteria
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified Rule 702 and the
admissibility of expert medical testimony in a case known as
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993).The Daubert case set out four factors used by
the courts in determining whether an expert witnesses’ the-
ory, technique, or opinion on the causing of a medical illness
is scientifically or medically valid such as to allow it to be
considered in the case. This standard is now used by courts
to determine whether a physician’s opinion on medical
causation is admissible in evidence for consideration by
the court or the jury. The Daubert factors and Rule 702
provide the standard for determining legal causation in a
civil lawsuit.
Those four primary, but non-exclusive, Daubert factors
are:
1. Can or has the medical or scientific theory, knowledge,
opinion, or technique been tested?
2. Has the medical or scientific theory, knowledge, opin-
ion, or technique been subjected to publication and peer
review?
3. Is there a known or potential rate of error for the meth-
od, knowledge, opinion, or technique?
4. Is the medical or scientific theory, knowledge, opinion,
or technique accepted by the majority of other medical
or scientific peers within the relevant medical or scien-
tific community?
These four Daubert factors are not the only ones a court
may consider, and the fact that the doctor’s opinion does not
meet one of the criteria does not necessarily result in exclu-
sion of the testimony. The lack of peer review or publication
will not preclude admissibility if the doctor’s opinion is
supported by widely-accepted scientific or medical knowl-
edge. The fact alone that a physician has extensive medical
training and several board certifications in specialty areas
will not make his or her opinion legally admissible or
reliable if the rest of the doctor’s peers do not accept that
opinion as mainstream. The physician’s specialties may
make him or her qualified as an expert, but do not make
the medical opinion on causation admissible.
In the Daubert case, the plaintiff’s attorney sought to
prove that Bendectin taken during pregnancy caused birth
defects. There were eight experts prepared to testify that
Bendectin taken during pregnancy both can (general causa-
tion) and did (specific causation) cause the child’s birth
defects. The Plaintiff sought to prove the causation using
in vitro, animal, and epidemiological studies. The U.S.
Supreme Court did not rule on the admissibility of the
physician’s opinions, but did establish the guidelines for
federal courts in determining the relevancy and reliability
of such medical opinions and scientific evidence.
Frequently, the state of medical/scientific knowledge and
research has not advanced far enough to warrant widespread
acceptance. The fact that the doctor feels passionately about
the medical evidence is not sufficient for the court to accept
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the opinion on medical causation if the rest of the medical
community itself is not sure. While future research and
studies may well validate the physician’s opinion on causa-
tion, sometimes the state of medical knowledge has not yet
progressed to the comfort level of the legal system. Yet, the
legal system mandates a scientific disposition at this point in
time. This demand may be unsettling for the physician
acting as an expert witness.
An Attorney’s Perspective: Confusion of the Courts
in Their Use of “Differential Diagnosis”
From an attorney’s perspective, the clinical treatment pro-
cess of rendering a diagnosis to identify the illness causing
the patient’s symptoms (a differential diagnosis) is often
confused by both doctors and attorneys with the process of
determining the specific scientific or medical cause of the
illness diagnosed (causal assessment). Many court opinions
have mixed the two methodologies by sometimes equating a
causal assessment to a differential diagnosis. In other words,
the courts have conflated the two methodologies when dis-
cussing them in written court opinions. In reality, the courts
are looking for, and want a causal assessment with, a high
degree of empirical or scientific and medical support and
proof, not a differential diagnosis.
The goal of the physician in performing a differential
diagnosis is to determine what illness is causing the symp-
toms in order to treat the patient. Determination of the
underlying cause or what actually produced the condition
is generally not critical in most clinical interactions. How-
ever, a claim requires a causal attribution. The court must
have a thorough explanation of whether the doctor’s opinion
on causal assessment is “ground[ed] in the methods and
procedures of science,” by considering the physician’s tes-
timony using a “two-pronged test of relevancy and reliabil-
ity in the context of scientific evidence.” [37••]. Relevancy
refers to testimony that is likely to be helpful to the court
and prove a key issue in the case. Reliability refers to
testimony which meets the Daubert criteria.
When determining during the trial whether a defendant is
liable for causing an injury (or illness), the judge or jury
must find by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the
defendant caused the harm, exposure, or injury to the plain-
tiff. The causal attribution must be established to a degree or
medical probability or certainty, clearly more than a coin
toss, and more than 50 %.
But Daubertmotions are heard before trial and must offer
the court an even higher degree of proof of causation before
the physician’s opinion is admissible. Each element used by
the expert must be established and generally accepted. For
the scientifically-based underpinnings (as needed for “can”
or general causation), the degree of certitude must follow
those generally required in science, or, by custom, greater
than 95 % (p value of<.05). Once that foundation (e.g., that
x is an established cause of y) is known with this degree of
probability, the doctor then may testify to opinions that all of
the causation elements were met—e.g., exposure was suffi-
cient, temporal relationships were correct, and other causes
were ruled out. Those elements of testimony, needed for
specific causation, require, not 95 % certainty, but a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard of greater than 50 %. Even
attorneys have difficulty getting a clear understanding of
this distinction between legal and scientific causal probabil-
ities. In fact, in the interest of “catching” the witness, they
may ask whether his testimony is stated to scientific or legal
certainty, implying that the former is more stringent than
necessary. The answer to that question is actually, “Both.”
Scientific certainty is needed to solidify general causation—
that such a relationship is known scientifically to be true.
Legal certainty (more probable than not) follows for the
remainder of the causal questions.
So, in essence, a Daubert inquiry is looking for causal
assessment of a high order from the physician who testifies
as to what environmental condition, exposure, biological pro-
cess, or other explanation led to the injury or harm that forms
the basis of the lawsuit. In the context of aDaubert inquiry, it is
safe to say that “legal causation” depends heavily on a reliable
and scientifically established medical “causal assessment.”
Ultimately, the judge acts as a “gatekeeper” in deciding to
let the doctor’s opinion in or to keep it out of consideration.
The legal vehicle most often used for addressing admissi-
bility of the physician’s opinion on medical causation is a
Daubert Motion to Exclude Evidence.
An Attorney’s Perspective: Using a Hypothetical
Medical and Legal Case
In the brief example which follows, we shall illustrate the
types of questions which an expert may face by opposing
counsel. These questions will vary depending upon the
expert’s specific opinions in the case. They might, for ex-
ample, challenge the diagnosis, the existence of an allergy,
the alleged allergenic agent, or the source of that agent.
Questions will also be posed which challenge the expert’s
qualifications and motivations.
Consider a 60 year-old male who rented an apartment
until his new condominium was completed. He has a 40
pack-years cigarette smoking history, but never had respira-
tory symptoms until having lived in this apartment for
2 months. He noticed a significant water leak in the guest
bedroom closet and visible mold growth limited to its ceil-
ing. He went to his internist for treatment of his shortness of
breath and cough, wondering if he had developed asthma
from mold in the apartment.
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Assuming that he became a claimant in a lawsuit against
the apartment owner, serving as the patient/claimant’s expert
witness, an allergist could be asked these sample questions.
They appear in a seemingly random order, a manner com-
monly employed by an experienced cross-examiner.
1. What respected, authoritative, and widely-accepted
medical studies and research support the link between
mold and this individual’s medical conditions?
2. Is the link a strong or weak association?
3. What is the typical period of exposure necessary to
produce the disease?
4. Has the claimant shown any IgE reaction to the sus-
pected allergens as confirmed by radioimmunoassay,
skin, or other tests?
5. Did the physician (or an environmental expert
performing accepted testing methodologies) sample
the air in the suspected bedroom closet and perform
such studies throughout the apartment to establish the
specific mold species and exposure level?
6. What was, in fact, the dose level of specific molds to
which the claimant was exposed?
7. Did the results of the allergy tests performed confirm
allergic sensitization to the same specific molds found
through environmental testing in the bedroom closet
and apartment?
8. Did the allergist review the previous medical history of
the claimant prior to his renting the apartment?
9. Can the allergist compare the claimant’s exposure to
mold or other allergens in the outdoor environment
versus exposure in the indoor environment?
10. What levels of each of those molds are commonly
found outdoors?
11. Were there any baseline air samples taken of the bed-
room closet, apartment, and outside air in the claim-
ant’s apartment?
12. Is the allergist sufficiently comfortable with the valid-
ity and methodology employed by the environmental
consultant who conducted sampling to rely on those
test results for providing a definitive statement of the
specific allergen, exposure, dose, and likely response?
13. Is there a known rate of allergic response associated
with the exposure and dose alleged to have occurred?
14. How much of the allergist’s opinion is based on
claimant-reported exposure conditions and subjective
symptoms versus the physician’s personal observation
and knowledge of the underlying environmental con-
ditions, pre-existing medical history, and objective
findings?
15. Has the allergist personally designed and performed
any medical studies using the scientific method (con-
trol vs. non-control groups) to confirm the validity of
the opinion that the indoor apartment exposure to the
specific molds in question under the extrapolated ex-
posure and dose data are sufficient to a high degree of
reliability in causing the specific medical illness and
symptoms observed, after accounting for all confound-
ing variables.
16. Has the allergist published the data or performed any
studies and reviews of medical literature to confirm the
proposed environmental or biological cause of the
illness?
17. What position do the majority of clinical allergists take
with regard to the medical literature, studies, and opin-
ion of the testifying allergist on the biological and
medical cause of this illness?
An Attorney’s Perspective: The Clinician in the Legal
Arena
Clinical practice seeks scientific and medical accuracy with-
out which the best treatment cannot be provided. A civil
claim, by contrast, provides a forum for the resolution of
disputes and most legal scholars argue (to the surprise of
inexperienced medical experts) that it is not a truth-seeking
forum at its core. The opposing attorneys are advocates. Their
interest is in winning, not in enlightening the court. This
distinction is felt by the expert when he/she undergoes intense
examination, whether in deposition or trial. The intent of those
questions, all designed to erode the expert’s credibility, may
be to prepare to file a Daubert motion to have the testimony
excluded or simply to win over a judge or a jury.
How can the allergist, as a witness, prepare for such an
encounter? The first rule is to be honest, accurate, and
consistent in his/her opinions. Attorneys will attempt to
impeach the expert’s integrity by demonstrating inconsis-
tencies in his/her prior opinions referenced in scientific
articles, depositions, and court testimonies. The expert must
not stray outside his/her areas of expertise. He/she must be
sure that the facts stated are both sufficient and reliable in
supporting the proffered position. The second is to know
those facts and their supporting bases well before encoun-
tering opposing counsel. Finally, while it may be difficult,
the witness should remain calm and rational in the face of
what may seem to be foolish and/or insulting questions. The
expert is not a combatant but rather a privileged participant
[38•].
Conclusion
This article has highlighted essential points, nuances, and
considerations for the practicing physician who will be
asked to render an expert medical opinion on the cause
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of a patient’s medical illness or condition. As a practis-
ing allergist/clinical immunologist (H.M.W.), physician/
toxicologist (R.E.G.), and an experienced civil litigation
attorney (R.P.H.), the authors have provided insights
into the challenges of rendering a diagnosis, determining
medical causal assessment, and offering a legal causa-
tion analysis. The primary focus was to help elucidate
the unfamiliar idiosyncrasies of a legal proceeding. As a
patient advocate or medical expert, participation in the
legal system is an opportunity to place state-of-the-art
science into case law.
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